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WRITTEN AND ORAL PERSUASION IN THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: A DISTRICT JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE
ON THEIR HISTORY, FUNCTION, AND FUTURE
Mark R. Kravitz*
The idea for this article developed several years ago as I
was preparing to teach a course at the University of Melbourne
Graduate School of Law, called "Effective Written Advocacy."
The course coincided with a trend in Australian courts toward a
more writing-focused appellate process, while Canada had
embarked on a similar transformation of its appellate practice
more than a decade before. I wanted to know why, relatively
early in our history, courts in the United States had rejected the
oral tradition of the English legal system-both in advocacy and
judicial opinions. My curiosity also coincided with an
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Dean of the University of Melbourne Law School; Judge Gerard E. Lynch of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; Judge John G. Koeltl of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York; Professor Catherine T. Struve of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School; David Fein; Peter Keisler; Jesse Furman; Aron
Ketchel; Nicole Hallett; and Erin Flynn. The author alone is responsible for any errors,
misstatements, or lapses in reasoning.
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experiment I had been conducting since my confirmation as a
federal district judge, which is to hold oral argument on virtually
every motion of any substance, something I am told is not the
norm in federal courts across the country. I wanted to think more
systematically about the differing functions served by written
and oral persuasion and why I found oral argument so
enormously valuable. Finally, I wanted to consider the future of
oral argument in a court system that is focused so heavily on
efficiency.
My purpose is to provoke discussion, not provide solutions.
I am heavily in the debt of those who have considered these
issues in much greater depth than I-none more so than
Professor Suzanne Ehrenberg, the author of a wonderful article
entitled Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process.I
I. HISTORY
As we all know, the English legal tradition has long
favored speech over writing. Until relatively recently,
everything English judges learned about a case, they learned at
oral argument. They also issued oral judgments and do so to this
day, although now they more often deliver them after reserving
decision rather than proceeding ex tempore-that is,
immediately following the oral argument. That the English
courts chose a speech-centered legal process should come as no
surprise, as speech has been the favored method of
communication throughout the history of Western culture. Oscar
Wilde noted that the "Greeks ... regarded writing simply as a
method of chronicling. Their test was always the spoken word.
' 2
And as Professor Ehrenberg reminds us, Plato has Socrates
explain in the Phaedrus that the written word is incapable of
expressing thoughts as precisely as the spoken word. As
1. Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 Iowa L.
Rev. 1159 (2004).
2. Oscar Wilde, The Critic as Artist, in Plays, Prose Writings and Poems 1, 12
(Alfred A. Knopf 1991). For a history of Roman oratory see Cicero, The Brutus, in On
Government 316-17 (Michael Grant trans., Penguin 1993) ("'Well, then, we take
Thucydides as our model.' Excellent, if you propose to write history, but if pleading of
cases is what you propose, not so good. Thucydides was a trustworthy and impressive
recorder of historical actions. But these forensic courtroom disputations of ours were not
his field.").
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Socrates puts it, while written words may seem to "understand
what they are saying . . if you ask them what they mean by
anything they simply return the same answer over and over
again.
At its inception, the United States borrowed much from the
English legal system, relying heavily on Blackstone, Coke, and
others to shape our legal culture. In fact, an order of the
Supreme Court on August 8, 1791, advised that
this court consider[s] the practice of the courts of king's
bench, and of chancery, in England, as affording outlines
for the practice of this court; and that they will, from time
to time, make such alterations therein as circumstances may
render necessary.4
However, early on, the courts of the new nation began to
opt for a legal process in which writing played an increasingly
critical role. Of course, we chose a written Constitution, with
enumerated individual rights, and our courts also embraced a
writing-focused legal process. This emphasis on writing appears
to have begun with courts' own judgments. In fact, in 1784, the
Connecticut legislature passed a law (the first in the nation)
requiring all judges to "reduce to Writing" the reasons for their
judgments. Many other states followed suit, so that, as
Professor Tiersma notes, "American judges at the close of the
eighteenth century were already beginning to draft their opinions
in writing." 6 And Professor Surrency, in his seminal History of
American Law Publishing, reports that "[a]ll evidence suggests
that written opinions became the accepted practice within the
first decades of the Nineteenth Century."7
The Supreme Court relied heavily upon oral opinions in its
early years. However, the second reporter to the Supreme Court,
William Cranch, suggested that by 1801 the justices had adopted
3. Ehrenberg, supra n. 1, at 1170 (citing Plato, Phaedrus 97 (Walter Hamilton trans.,
Penguin 1988)).
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) xvi (1803) (referring to Rule VII, issued Aug. 8, 1791).
5. See Acts & Laws of Conn. § 41, at 129 (Hudson & Goodwin 1796); see also
William D. Popkin, Evolution of the Judicial Opinion 183-87 (NYU Press 2007).
6. Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1187,
1225 (2007).
7. Erwin C. Surrency, A History of American Law Publishing 42 (Oceana
Publications 1990); see generally John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the
United States Supreme Court, 1790-1945, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 137 (1999).
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the practice of writing out their opinions in cases of difficulty or
importance. 8 Congress authorized the Supreme Court to appoint
an official reporter of decisions in 1817, and in 1834, the Court
issued an order marking the end of the era of oral opinions: The
order required that opinions be delivered to the reporter, who
would in turn return them to the clerk of the court for filing after
publication. 1° Even though the Supreme Court's opinions are
written, the Court continues to this day to announce its opinions
orally from the bench.
The early American emphasis on written opinions stood in
marked contrast to the English practice of the time. The English
judicial tradition has been described as one of "comprehensive
orality." 11 Indeed, Sir Edward Coke wrote that requiring judges
to write out their opinions would require immense labor by
judges and take them away from their duties. He wrote that their
records would be "Elephantini libri" and would "lose somewhat
of their present authority and reverence." 12 I wonder what he
would think today.
The emerging primacy of writing over speech in American
courts was not limited to court judgments. We all learned in law
school about the days-long orations by early Supreme Court
advocates such as William Pinkney, William Wirt, and Daniel
Webster. 13 Yet it is said that those lengthy set-piece arguments
8. Surrency, supra n. 7, at 62 (noting in addition that Cranch became the reporter in
1801 when the Court moved from Philadelphia to Washington); but see Popkin, supra n. 5,
at 82-83 ("one commentator suggests that Cranch may have referred only to the Justice's
notes").
9. G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835, in The
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States vols. III-
IV, 389 (Stanley N. Katz ed., MacMillan Pub. Co. 1988).
10. Id.; see also Popkin, supra n. 5, at 83 (asserting that "the 1834 order reflects a
growing practice of written opinions, not their requirement"). Professor Popkin surmises
that "what happened is that the practice of writing judicial opinions [in the Supreme Court],
at least in important cases, began as a way for the judge to deliver oral opinions efficiently
(by reading from a manuscript) and as a response to concerns about reportorial accuracy."
Id.
11. Robert J. Martineau, Appellate Justice in England and the United States: A
Comparative Analysis 101 (W.S. Hein 1990) ("The heart of the English legal system and
upon which all major aspects of it are based is the oral tradition.").
12. Edward Coke, The Reports of Sir Edward Coke (new ed., Joseph Butterworth and
Son 1826), pt. 2, at v.
13. Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court: The Felt Necessities of
the Time, in Supreme Court Historical Society Yearbook 22, 23 (S. Ct. Historical Socy.
1985) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court entertained these orations not only without
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prompted Chief Justice Marshall to quip that the "acme of
judicial distinction means the ability to look a lawyer straight in
the eyes for two hours and not hear a damned word he says."' 4
The emphasis on oratory in the Supreme Court nonetheless
continued well into the nineteenth century. In 1821, the
attorneys in Gibbons v. Ogden argued for six days. John Quincy
Adams and Roger Baldwin argued for eight days in the Amistad
case in 1841.15 But by then pressure had already begun to build
for a move away from such lengthy oratory and toward a
writing-focused legal process in the Supreme Court.
The first writing requirement in the Supreme Court was
adopted in 1795; the Supreme Court's Rule 8 required attorneys
to submit "a statement of material points of the case. ' 1 Then, in
1821, the Supreme Court rules made their first reference to the
word "brief," requiring "a printed brief or abstract
containing the substance of all the material pleadings, facts and
documents . . . and the points of law and facts intended to be
presented."' 7 As Chief Justice Rehnquist once explained, 18 these
early "briefs" were quite brief indeed, totaling no more than six
to ten pages in length. Still, it was a start, and was quite different
from the practice prevailing before the King's Bench at that
time.
limitation upon time but also without interruption").
14. White, supra n. 9, at 182; Albert Jeremiah Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall
vol. 4, 83 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1919).
15. Three days into the Amistad argument, Justice Barbour died. The argument
continued without him.
16. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 120 (1795). As David Frederick has explained, "[t]hat rule might
be read by modem eyes to be an invitation to file a written brief, but if it was, the bar did
not get the hint. Instead, lawyers interpreted that rule as requiring them to fill their oral
presentations with citations and long excerpts of learned treatises in support of the
argument." David C. Frederick, Supreme Court Advocacy in the Early Nineteenth Century,
30 J. S. Ct. History 1, 3 (2005).
17. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) v (1817) (referring to Supreme Court Rule XXX). "Brief' was
then used in English practice to refer to the document that a solicitor would give the
barrister who would argue the case for the solicitor's client; the brief contained the
statement of facts, pleadings, and documentation needed for the case. Martineau, supra n.
11, at 62; see also David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law 152 (Oxford U. Press
1980).
18. William H. Rehnquist, From Webster to Word-Processing: The Ascendance of the
Appellate Brief 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 1, 2 (1999) (noting the December 1854 filing of
"[n]ine pages of briefs in three cases" then before the Supreme Court); see also R. Kirkland
Cozine, The Emergence of Written Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-Century United
States, 38 Am. J. Leg. History 482 (1994).
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Because of the demands of travel in early nineteenth-
century America, the Supreme Court in 1833 gave counsel the
option of submitting their cases on the papers, ordering that "in
all cases brought here on appeal, writ of error, or otherwise, the
court will receive printed arguments, if the Counsel on either or
both sides shall choose so to submit the same."' 9 This
innovation was prompted by the Court's desire to
"accommodate Counsel, and save expense to parties. '' 2° The
Supreme Court later clarified that such cases "shall stand on the
same footing as if there were an appearance of counsel.'
No doubt influenced by their burgeoning workload and the
demands of riding circuit, the Justices imposed the first limits on
oral argument in 1849, restricting each advocate to two hours of
22
oral argument, absent special leave of the Court. The same rule
provided that counsel would not be permitted to present oral
argument unless he first filed a printed abstract of points and
authorities. The brief thus became an essential feature of
Supreme Court practice because it allowed counsel to make up
for lost argument time. Furthermore, in an important innovation
that served to emphasize the primacy of written submissions, the
new rule cautioned counsel that attorneys would be prohibited
from referring to any book or case that was not referenced in the
points and authorities.23 The brief thus began to mark the metes
and bounds of oral argument.
In 1858, the Supreme Court limited oral argument even
further by restricting the number of attorneys who could argue
on each side to two; without leave of the Court, therefore, oral
24argument was restricted to a maximum of eight hours. By
1871, about a year after Congress had enacted legislation to
establish the office of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court
19. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) iv (1833).
20. Id.
21. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) vii (1837). See Cozine, supra n. 18, at 490-93 for a description of
early cases submitted on written submissions.
22. 48 U.S. (7 How.) v (1849) (Rule 54); see also Frederick, supra n. 16, at 12 ("Not
only was the Court's docket increasing, but the Justices were not receiving any relief from
their circuit-riding duties.").
23. Frederick, supra n. 16, at 12-13; see also David C. Frederick, Supreme Court and
Appellate Advocacy 25 (West Group 2003) [hereinafter Frederick, Advocacy].
24. 62 U.S. (21 How.) xii (1858) (Rule 21).
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acted to cut argument even further-to a maximum of two hours
per side regardless of the number of advocates.
25
With oral argument time shrinking and briefs becoming
more important, the Supreme Court took steps in 1884 to dictate
the content of the briefs submitted to it by adopting a new Rule
21. The new version required "a brief of the argument,
exhibiting a clear statement of the points of law or fact to be
discussed, with . . . references to . . . the authorities relied
upon.''26 The attorneys were thus required to relate their
arguments to specific legal authorities or record citations. While
shorter than their modern-day counterparts, these late
nineteenth-century briefs are recognizable to today's
practitioners. As Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, "[w]ith these
new requirements, the modem brief was born. 27
The trajectory of developments in oral versus written
persuasion that occurred in the Supreme Court was mirrored in,
perhaps even led by, state appellate courts.28 First, state courts
required minimal written submissions, then they allowed written
submissions in lieu of argument, and finally, they limited the
length of oral argument in all cases.29 For example, oral
argument in the New York Court of Appeals was limited to two
hours in 1850. By 1860, written submissions in that court are
said to have resembled the modem-day brief.30 The 1860 rules
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court required a "printed
or written statement of the points on which [the attorney] intends
to rely, and the authorities intended to be cited in support of
them." The Massachusetts rules also limited oral argument to
two hours per side.3 1 Professor Ehrenberg thus concludes that
[t]he history of appellate practice in nineteenth-century
America, therefore, shows a movement from the use of oral
argument as the court's principal means of learning about a
case, with the brief as a supplement, to the use of oral
25. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) ix (1870) (Rule 21).
26. 108 U.S. 585 (1884) (Rule 21).
27. Rehnquist, supra n. 18, at 3.
28. Cozine, supra n. 18, at 498-523.
29. Ehrenberg, supra n. 1, at 1182.
30. Cozine, supra n. 18, at 521 (describing contents of "typical" briefs filed in New
York's highest court by 1860); see also Ehrenberg, supra n. 1, at 1182.
31. Cozine, supra n. 18, at 500 (quoting Mass. Rule XXX and Rule XXXI, 80 Mass.
(14 Gray) 349 (1860)).
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argument as a supplement to the brief.
3 2
These developments of the nineteenth century continued
into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with courts in the
United States increasingly de-emphasizing oral argument and
placing more and more emphasis on written persuasion. The
Supreme Court continues to rely on oral argument, though
argument time since 1984 has been limited to one-half hour per
side.33 And Professor Meador has shown that the federal courts
of appeals began disposing of cases without argument around
the middle of the twentieth century.34 Currently, Rule 34 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure permits federal appellate
courts to dispense with argument where
(A) the appeal is frivolous;
(B) the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively
decided; or
(C) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented
in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would
not be significantly aided by oral argument.35
Today, the Second Circuit may be the only circuit in the
country to hold oral argument in virtually every case other than
routine immigration cases, although the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits also hold argument in most non-pro se cases. The
Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that in
the twelve-month period ending December 31, 2007, the federal
courts of appeals disposed of a little over 31,000 appeals on the
merits; oral argument was held in about 8,700, and nearly
23,000 were disposed of on the briefs.36 The Fifth Circuit
32. Ehrenberg, supra n. 1, at 1183 (footnote omitted).
33. U.S. S. Ct. R. 28(3).
34. See Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42
Md. L. Rev. 732, 732-34 (1983); see also Ehrenberg, supra n. 1, at 1162 (pointing out that
"[o]ver the past 150 years, appellate courts .. have increasingly limited the role of oral
argument").
35. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(A)-(C).
36. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Office of Judges Programs,
Statistics Division, Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary December 31, 2007 at tbl.
B-I (chart entitled U.S. Courts of Appeals-Appeals Commenced, Terminated, and
Pending, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2007) (Admin.
Office of the U.S. Cts. 2008) (also available at http://www.uscourts.gov/stats/dec07/B01
Dec07.pdf (accessed Sept. 21, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process)).
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disposed of 4,900 appeals on the merits in that period but held
oral argument in only 1,000, about twenty percent of all appeals
that it resolved on the merits; the Eleventh Circuit held argument
in about the same percentage of cases, disposing of
approximately 3,000 appeals on the merits and holding
argument in only about 600 cases. This movement away from
oral argument prompted a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee in
1999 to recommend that "[c]ourts [of appeals] with permissive
standards for granting oral argument, or which grant oral
argument every time it is requested, should seriously consider
modifying their policies so that the deciding judges might
exercise increased discretion not to hear cases they do not
believe warrant oral argument."
37
Of course, oral argument in many federal district courts is
even more rare than in the federal courts of appeals. Indeed, at a
recent hearing of the Judicial Conference's Civil Rules Advisory
Committee on proposals to amend Rule 56, which governs
summary judgment, a chief complaint of practitioners-
plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers alike-was that district court
judges rarely, if ever, provide an opportunity for oral argument
on summary judgment motions. There appears to be a
widespread belief among both court of appeals and district court
judges that oral argument is inefficient and consumes too much
court time, without attendant benefit. This rejection of oral
argument has also been accompanied by a movement away from
oral judgments and opinions.
So, why did the United States legal system opt relatively
early for a more writing-focused legal process, while oral
persuasion retained its primacy in England (as well as in Canada
and Australia) for far longer? In truth, we are not exactly sure,
though there are a number of likely reasons. For one, early in
our history, there were not many professional lawyers trained in
the oral tradition of English courts. Also, there was a profound
distrust of courts in early nineteenth-century America,38 leading
37. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight
and the Courts, Chairman's Report on the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the
United States Courts of Appeals 10 (Mar. 1999).
38. See e.g. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 323-25
(Alfred A. Knopf 1992) (outlining the rise of an independent judiciary). Indeed, distrust of
the courts has a long history in the United States. See e.g. Alexander Hamilton, The
Federalist Papers, No. 78 471 (New American Library 1961). ("To avoid an arbitrary
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(in part I suspect) to statutory requirements that courts put their
judgments in writing. Undoubtedly as well, the new nation
wanted to build a body of binding precedent, something England
already had. Thus, Connecticut's law requiring written opinions
also required them to be kept on file so that "thereby a
Foundation be laid for a more perfect and permanent System of
common Law in this State." 39 In short, the very different
demands on the judiciaries in each country contributed to their
differing approaches to oral and written persuasion.
For another reason, consider that this country, even then,
was significantly larger than England. Given the size of the
United States, travel was difficult, making it easier and less
costly to submit one's arguments in writing to far-away courts.
40
Commercial printers, and then typewriters, also became more
available throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The increasing workload of appellate courts also
meant they could no longer devote days to oral argument,
particularly when the judges themselves often did not find the
lengthy arguments very useful. 41 As is true today, the need for
efficiency drove courts to written submissions. And as courts
increasingly came to rely on the parties' written advocacy,
lengthy oral arguments were seen as inefficient and unnecessary.
I should also add that as courts relied more and more on
written submissions and constricted oral argument, American
lawyers turned from speech to writing as their principal form of
persuasion. Victor Hugo observed that the printing press
destroyed the cathedral, for "[o]nce writing replaced stone
sculpture and stained glass as the principal medium for
education, the days of stone carving as a fine art were
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules
and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them.").
39. Acts & Laws, supra n. 5; see also Popkin, supra n. 5, at 88-93 (discussing the
reasons for written opinions in nineteenth-century state courts).
40. See Cozine, supra n. 18, at 494.
41. Like his modem-day counterparts, Justice Story complained to the advocates of his
day about the length and poor quality of their oral advocacy. Justice John Catron
apparently urged Chief Justice Roger Taney to "take responsibility for suppression of
irrelevant oratory." See Carl Brent Swisher, The Taney Period, 1836-64, in The Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States vol. V, 278
(Macmillan & Co., Inc. 1974); Frederick, Advocacy, supra n. 23, at 25.
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numbered. ' ' 2 So, too, here. Just as the so-called vanishing trial
has led to fewer opportunities to hone lawyers' trial skills, the
decline in argument provided fewer occasions to practice the
subtle art of oral advocacy.
No doubt there are other reasons for the divergence of
approaches in the legal systems of the United States and
England. Some have suggested that the persistence of the oral
tradition in England is simply because barristers-who hold the
majority of power in the English legal system-see the
American focus on written submissions as posing a threat to
their authority and possibly even their survival.43 Also, it may be
that lawyers in England are simply more interested in, or
attached to, their traditions than are lawyers in the United States
to theirs. Therefore, English lawyers may have hewed more
strongly to their traditional speech-centered legal process for
that reason alone, and not because it was superior to written
44persuasion. An undue attachment to past practices can
certainly be seen as a form of inertia-confusing the familiar
with the necessary. But as Professor Kronman has reminded us,
tradition can also enjoy a certain moral prestige of its own.4 5
II. FUNCTION
While we may not know the precise causes of the shift in
focus by United States courts from speech to writing, I believe
we can probably say that it was not the result of any conscious
and systematic decision about the differing functions that oral
and written persuasion should play in our legal system.
In their collection of essays on the theory and research
regarding persuasion, Professors Dillard and Pfau observe that
how individuals exercise influence via communication is a
42. See e.g. Richard Hyland, A Defense of Legal Writing, 134 U. Penn. L. Rev. 599,
625-26 (1986) (attributing this insight to Victor Hugo)).
43. Ehrenberg, supra n. 1, at 1177-78; see also Martineau, supra n. 11, at 132.
44. Martineau, supra note 11, at 130. According to one commentator, English common-
law courts "constantly tinkered with procedural changes to improve their case
administration" and efficiency. Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment is Constitutional, 93
Iowa L. Rev. 1625, 1648-49 (2008) (citing S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the
Common Law (Butterworths 1969) and J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal
History (4th ed., Oxford U. Press 2005)).
45. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L.J. 1029 (1990).
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question "so basic and so important that it has challenged
scholars for centuries."'46 You will be relieved to know that I do
not propose to survey here the substantial scholarship devoted to
that challenging issue. Nor do I intend to enter the never-ending
philosophical debate over the value of speech versus writing-a
debate that has been described as an
ideological conflict between those who view the written
language as something sacred and superior to speech, and
those who consider writing to be a mere Johnny-come-
lately, an excrescence of speech, which is the only "true"
language.
47
Rather, I hope to focus some attention on the different strengths
and weaknesses of oral and written persuasion, because it is
clear to me that each mode of persuasion should fulfill a
different and important role in our legal system. I will begin
with writing and what I believe is its greatest strength.
A. Writing
Writing, Abraham Lincoln famously remarked, is the great
invention of the world.48 As lawyers and judges, most of us
believe-I certainly do-that the process of committing one's
arguments and reasoning to writing requires a greater level of
critical and creative thinking than merely expressing one's
thoughts orally. Hence the well-known directive "See how it
writes." We are more precise when we put our thoughts in
writing than when we verbalize them: Once we commit our
words to paper, we can more easily see and understand the form
46. The Persuasion Handbook: Developments in Theory and Practice ix (James Price
Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., Sage Publications, Inc. 2002) [hereinafter The Persuasion
Handbook].
47. Mario Pei, Is Language Abused? in Language Today: A Survey of Current
Linguistic Thought 1, 9-10 (Mario Pei ed., Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1967); see also D.W.
Cummings, American English Spelling 463 (Johns Hopkins U. Press 1988) ("[lI]n the early
twentieth century the emphasis shifted to the spoken language. Speech was viewed as the
'real' language; writing was at best a secondary shadow. In the past two decades, however,
attention has shifted back to the written language and its orthography. The orthographic
discipline appears to be experiencing a reawakening.").
48. Abraham Lincoln, U.S. Pres., Lecture, Second Lecture on Discoveries and
Inventions (Feb. 11, 1859) (available at Ashland University, Ashbrook Center for Public
Affairs, Document Library--Civil War Era, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library
(accessed Oct. 14, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process)).
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and shape of our arguments, we can revisit them often, gaining
needed distance between readings. This process of writing and
reading, re-writing and re-reading, allows us to gain greater
insight into the foundations (and the cracks in the foundations)
of our arguments. 49 In short, written ideas are subject to more
sustained thought, consideration, and improvement than those
expressed orally.
Good writing is clear thinking revealed.5 ° Poor writing, by
contrast, inevitably indicates a lack of clarity in thought.5 This
is not a new proposition. In 1783, Hugh Blair, who had a
profound effect on American rhetoric in the nineteenth century,
wrote that
whenever we express ourselves ill, there is, besides the
mismanagement of Language, for the most part, some
mistake in our manner of conceiving the subject.
Embarrassed, obscure, and feeble Sentences are generally,
if not always, the result of embarrassed, obscure, and feeble
thought.
52
The process of writing, therefore, should lead to more
critical legal analysis and better legal arguments or reasoning.
Professor Ehrenberg puts it this way:
Through this dialogue, the writer can engage in a much
fuller and richer consideration of contradictory evidence,
counter arguments, and the complex elements of a subject
than is ever possible in oral communication alone ...
[T]he ability to read what we have written permits a greater
distancing between the individual, language and reference
than speech, a greater objectification which increases the
analytic potential of the human mind. The orator, as
opposed to the writer, can more easily deceive himself and
49. See generally Laurel Currie Oates, Beyond Communication: Writing as a Means of
Learning, 6 J. Legal Writing Inst. 1 (2000) (discussing theories about, and research into,
writing as a means of learning, and including information about the types of learning likely
to be enhanced by various law-school writing assignments).
50. See Ambrose Bierce, Write It Right: A Little Blacklist of Literary Faults 13
(Grabhorn-Hoyem 1971) (asserting that good writing is "clear thinking made visible").
51. Hyland, supra n. 42, at 623 (noting that "good legal writing is still clear conceptual
thinking, convincingly displayed"); see also Carl Bereiter & Marlene Scardamalia, The
Psychology of Written Composition 302-03 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 1987) (discussing
the role of reflection in the process of writing).
52. Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres 245 (Harold F. Harding ed.,
So. I11. U. Press 1965) (facsimile of 1783 original).
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others with an internally inconsistent argument because the
oral mode makes criticism more difficult.
5 3
Judge Posner recently made this same point. In a published
opinion, he lamented that a district judge had imposed an out-of-
guidelines sentence orally and suggested that when a judge
decides to impose a non-guidelines sentence, "he write out his
reasons rather than relying entirely on the transcript of his oral
remarks., 54  As Judge Posner noted, "[t]he discipline of
committing one's thoughts to paper not only promotes
thoughtful consideration but also creates a surer path of
communication with the reviewing court."
55
Beyond the value that writing provides to counsel (or a
judge) in sharpening his or her own arguments or reasoning,
written submissions also allow the recipient of the writing to
better understand our arguments-in Judge Posner's words,
writing is a "surer path of communication." Writing thus
enhances learning, not only by the author, but also by the reader.
53. Ehrenberg, supra n. 1, at 1188 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Jack
Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society 142 (Cambridge U. Press
1987)); Blair, supra n. 52, at 245-46 ("Thought and Language act and re-act upon each
other mutually."); but see Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the
Judicial Function, 96 Geo. L.J. 1283, 1303 (2008) ("[W]hile many types of
decisionmaking benefit from being made pursuant to a process that incorporates a written
component-including perhaps most of the sorts of decisions that judges are called upon to
make-not all do."); Ill. Bell Tel. Co., Inc. v. Box, 548 F.3d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Posner, J.) (pointing out that "[a]lthough the dual federal-state regulatory scheme for the
telecommunications industry is complex and even arcane, the parties did not need to
assault us with 200 pages of briefs brimming with jargon and technical details," and that
"[c]larity, simplicity, and brevity are underrated qualities in legal advocacy").
54. U.S. v. Higdon, 531 F.3d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2008). See also In re Jones, 768 F.2d
923, 932 (7th Cir. 1985), in which Judge Posner, concurring, explained:
When a judge decides a case by an oral opinion he should make that opinion
tentative, should reserve judgment, and should ask the court reporter to
transcribe the opinion. When the judge gets the transcript he should edit it,
polish it, add the necessary citations, amplify it if necessary, and then issue it
together with the judgment order. Both the delay caused by this procedure and
the added work for the judge should be slight, and outweighed by the benefits to
the parties and counsel of getting a finished judicial product on which they can
base an informed judgment on whether to appeal and how to brief and argue the
appeal, and by the fact that the judge will not be open to the accusation that he
gives more consideration to litigants whose cases are appealed than to other
litigants.
Id. at 932 (Posner, J., concurring).
55. Higdon, 531 F.3d at 565; see also Frank M. Coffin, The Ways of a Judge:
Reflections from the Federal Appellate Bench 57-58 (Houghton Mifflin 1980) (noting that
writing acts as a constraint on judging).
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For just like the author, the reader can return to the written
submissions time and again in the process of seeking to gain a
greater understanding of the issues. A comment during oral
argument passes in an instant and the full import of a particular
oral comment may be lost in the back and forth of questioning.
But the point made in a written brief remains available as a
source for repeated consultation and thought.
Perhaps, too, because today our ability to learn aurally has
diminished so substantially, most of us find it necessary to see
(and I mean literally to see) an argument before we can grasp
it.5 6 Indeed, the British philosopher Stephen Toulmin describes
an argument as "an organism." He points out that
[i]t has both a gross, anatomical structure and a finer as-it-
were physiological one.... [The] paragraphs.., represent
the chief anatomical units of the argument-its organs, so
to speak. But within each paragraph, when one gets down
to the level of individual sentences, a finer structure can be
recognized. ... It is at this physiological level that. .. the
validity of our arguments has ultimately to be established or
refuted.
57
Today at least, we need this organism before us on paper. We
need to see the text before we can properly assess the validity-
or invalidity-of the arguments advanced.
Written briefs, while perhaps costly, are also a superior and
more efficient method of conveying detailed information to a
judge. No matter how well we judges may take notes, it is
difficult to absorb, let alone retain, numerous factual details or
other case-specific information if they are provided only orally.
As Lord Donaldson, Master of the Rolls, acknowledged in his
1986 annual review, "Judges, like anyone else, can absorb
written material more quickly if they read it themselves, than if
it is read to them.' ,58 That is why early courts in the United
States required lawyers to provide their points, authorities, and
citations in writing. And, of course, when it comes time to draft
56. See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice 184-85
(Princeton U. Press 1949) (quoting F.C.S. Schiller: "[T]o put an argument in syllogistic
form is to trip it bare for logical inspection. We can then see where its weak point must lie,
if it has any.").
57. Stephen E. Toulmin, The Uses ofArgument 94 (Cambridge U. Press 1958).
58. Martineau, supra n. 11, at 120-21 (quoting 1996 annual review by the Master of the
Rolls).
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an opinion, it is always handy for the judge to have the written
submission, and all of its points and authorities, at hand. Put
differently, because the judge need not expend great effort in
capturing and storing an argument to memory, he can expend
more energy on understanding it and assessing its
persuasiveness.59
Enough of the strengths. What of the weaknesses of written
persuasion? For one, it is not as responsive as oral persuasion.
As Socrates pointed out, if you ask the written word what is
meant, the words "simply return to the same answer over and
over again." Counsel may not cover in the brief a point the judge
believes is important and would like the parties to address. Or
the court might be confused about an issue discussed by the
parties in their briefs. More than once when I was an attorney, I
showed up for oral argument only to discover that the judges
had certain important points all wrong. Of course, now that I am
a judge I understand fully that the misunderstanding was my
fault, not that of the judges. If there had been no oral argument,
however, I would not have had the opportunity to set the record
straight. Indeed, I would not even have known of the
misunderstanding until I saw the opinion.
Worse yet, the parties' briefs may be two ships passing in
the night, neither ever coming to grips with the other side's key
points. This is true even in reply briefs. Frankly, this is what I
frequently find in briefs filed in my court, even by good lawyers.
And often it is not wholly unintentional. For some reason that
remains a mystery to me, too many lawyers believe that it is to
their advantage to avoid unfavorable issues by not directly
responding to them in their briefs.
In sum, then, while written persuasion may not always be
as responsive as a good oral presentation, briefs are far more
efficient than oral argument in conveying large amounts of
information. Requiring parties to put their arguments and
reasoning in writing also improves the quality of their
arguments, and one hopes, the courts' opinions as well.60
59. Oldfather, supra n. 53, at 1304.
60. But see id. at 1317-44 (canvassing research literature and concluding that
sometimes requiring a written opinion will lead to a worse decision).
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B. Oral Presentation
In our rush toward efficiency, however, we often ignore or
de-value the strengths of oral argument. I would like to begin
with the importance of the spectacle, or ceremonial, aspects of
oral argument, something to which we do not pay adequate
attention. Part of the reason that the English legal system has
clung to oral argument is the English belief that justice must be
seen in order to be done.61 In the English legal system, litigants
and the public can watch the judges as they receive information
about the case, consider that information and the arguments of
counsel, and ultimately deliver their opinions. Not so here. In
fact, in the federal courts of appeals, oral argument is the only
avenue that citizens have for contact with appellate judges.
There is great value in allowing litigants and the public to
see judges facing lawyers and one another and grappling with
the issues in the cases before them.62 Otherwise, briefs go in one
end of the opinion factory (also known as the federal court
building) and opinions come out the other end, without any
chance for the public or the parties to understand who really
decided the case and whether the decisionmakers truly
understood the parties' concerns. I do not mean for a moment to
confuse the ability to see the process in action with
accountability for the results of that process; in the latter sense,
there is plenty of accountability in our current system.63 But
some oral argument is essential to provide the judicial branch-
the "least democratic and most isolated branch of
government"-with what Judge Myron Bright of the Eighth
Circuit described as "some semblance of public visibility and
61. See Ehrenberg, supra n. 1, at 1166; Daniel J. Meador, English Appellate Judges
from an American Perspective, 66 Geo. L.J. 1349, 1363 (1978); Martineau, supra n. 11, at
102-03.
62. See William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Art, 35 Mercer L. Rev.
1015, 1021-22 (1984) (noting that, among its other benefits, "oral argument serves a
function over and above its usefulness in adding to the presentation of the briefs of the
parties," and pointing out that "[i]t has the value that any public ceremony has"); Eugene
R. Fidell, A Modest Proposal, Natl. L.J. 23 (Feb. 4, 2008) ("Reducing the judicial process
to the transmission and receipt of electrons and PDF files, without any live courtroom
activity, may speed things up (although, in candor, this seems questionable), but it comes at
an institutional cost.").
63. See Ehrenberg, supra n. 1, at 1194-95; Martineau, supra n. 11, at 118-20.
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accountability." 64 Or as Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized,
"[o]ral argument is important as a means of giving judges a
continuing awareness of their relationship and dependence on
others; without it, the judge is isolated from all but a limited
group of subordinates.
Beyond visibility and accountability, oral argument serves
other important functions as well. When properly conducted,
oral argument can be responsive to the concerns of judges in
ways that briefs simply cannot. At its best, oral argument is a
conversation between the lawyer and the judge about the case.
The argument gives a judge the opportunity to try ideas out on
counsel, to clarify the judge's own thinking, or to put direct
questions about issues that may puzzle the judge or that the
lawyer did not cover in his brief.6 6 In a very real sense, argument
is the last chance for the judge to give the party who may soon
lose the case an opportunity to respond to the judge's concerns
and to straighten the judge out if she needs it. Argument also
gives judges the chance to test what a particular holding might
mean beyond the case at hand.
As a consequence, appellate opinions often comment on
clarifications or concessions made at oral argument. 67 When
64. Myron H. Bright, The Power of the Spoken Word: In Defense of Oral Argument, 72
Iowa L. Rev. 35, 36 (1986); see also Judith Resnick, Courts, In and Out of Sight, Site and
Cite, 53 Villanova L. Rev. 771, 783-84 (2008) (noting that public processes promote
democratic values).
65. Rehnquist, supra n. 62, at 1022 (quoting Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J. Meador &
Maurice Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal 17 (West Pub. Co. 1976)); see also Clint Williams,
Justice Thomas Extols the Need to Listen, Fulton Co. Daily Rep. (Oct. 24, 2008) (quoting
Justice Thomas, who was commenting on the value of oral argument, as saying that oral
argument was essential on a broader level, because "[iut's important for people in our
society to feel they can have their say") (also available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article
.jsp?id=1202425512909 (accessed Sept. 24, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process)).
66. See Shapiro, supra n. 13, at 29 ("If a point is irrelevant, it can be cut off. If
weaknesses have been obscured by a mass of detail in the briefs, the Court can expose
those weaknesses through questions and answers. The Court can, in short, break down
problems into manageable components and focus light where it is most needed through the
questioning process.").
67. See e.g. Frederick Liu, Citing the Transcript of Oral Argument: Which Justices Do
it and Why, 118 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 32, 33 (Sept. 1, 2008) ("In the roughly 2600 opinions
written during this fourteen-year span, there were 787 citations of the transcript.")
(archived at http://yalelawjoumal.org/content/view/699/14/ (accessed Sept. 24, 2009; copy
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process)); Timothy R. Johnson, Oral
Arguments and Decision Making on the United States Supreme Court 122 (St. U. of N.Y.
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arguing in a written brief with one's opponent, all the incentives
are to be unreasonable, and that is especially true if counsel
knows there will not be any argument, and therefore, counsel
will not have to answer to a judge for what was written in the
brief. Lawyers may feel perfectly at ease making extreme
arguments in their papers that they would never make with a
straight face directly to a judge. In contrast, all of the incentives
on counsel are to be reasonable at argument, because there they
are in a face-to-face conversation with a knowledgeable and
prepared judge. That is why concessions are made at oral
argument and rarely, if ever, in briefs.68
Lawyers can also enhance (or lose) credibility with the
court during oral argument in many more ways than is possible
in a written submission. With trials vanishing, oral argument is
one of the few opportunities lawyers have to interact with the
judge. Lawyers are held accountable at oral argument. There is
no place to hide when one stands at the lectern before the
judges; it truly is a lonely spot. Counsel have no choice but to
respond to the court's questions about aspects of the case that
they might have purposefully ignored in their briefs. And as
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner note in their recent book on
advocacy, "the quality of oral argument can convey to the court
that the brief already submitted is the product of a highly
capable and trustworthy attorney, intimately familiar with the
Press 2004) (indicating that data "suggests ... that the oral arguments in a case provide
unique information the justices use when they make substantive choices about the merits of
a case").
68. In a different context, the Supreme Court when speaking of the Confrontation
Clause has noted the value of face-to-face encounters and the truth that emerges from
them:
What was true of old is no less true in modem times. President Eisenhower once
described face-to-face confrontation as part of the code of his hometown of
Abilene, Kansas. In Abilene, he said, it was necessary to "[m]eet anyone face to
face with whom you disagree. You could not sneak up on him from behind, or
do any damage to him, without suffering the penalty of an outraged citizenry...
• In this country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up in
front. He cannot hide behind the shadow." ... The phrase still persists, "Look
me in the eye and say that." Given these human feelings of what is necessary for
fairness, the right of confrontation "contributes to the establishment of a system
of criminal justice in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness
prevails."
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.1012, 1017-18 (1988) (footnotes omitted). I am indebted to Peter
Keisler for suggesting this particular insight.
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facts and the law of the case. ' 69 Or, I might add, just the
opposite.
Oral argument is also an important opportunity for judges
on appellate courts to speak to each other through counsel before
they must vote on the case. As Justice White once observed,
All of us on the bench [are] working on the case, trying to
decide it .... [The lawyers] think we are there just to learn
about the case. Well, we are learning, but we are trying to
decide it, too .... [I]t is then that all of the Justices are
working on the case together, having read the briefs and
anticipating that they will have to vote very soon, and
attempting to clarify their own thinking and perhaps that of
their colleagues. Consequently, we treat lawyers as a
resource rather than as orators. l
Or as now-Chief Justice, then Judge, Roberts put it, oral
argument "is the organizing point for the entire judicial
process."'
Similarly, oral argument gives the lawyers the chance to
clarify their arguments, to examine issues from a different
perspective, or to change the emphasis of their presentations. By
the time oral argument occurs, counsel usually have a well-
honed sense of the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments
and which issues are likely to be determinative. It is usually a
more developed sense than counsel had at the time the briefs
were written. Therefore, there is a maturity and spontaneity in
the face-to-face conversation at a good oral argument that
cannot be achieved in the written brief. Often, that spontaneity
has a way of unlocking more insights about the issues in the case
69. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading
Judges 140 (Thomson/West 2008); see also Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal
Audience, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 85, 104 (1994) ("[P]ersuasive discourse depends as much on
the advocate's character and credibility (ethos) as it does on the logic of the argument or
the emotional content of the case."); Ronald J. Waicukauski, JoAnne Epps & Paul Mark
Sandier, Ethos and the Art of Argument, 26 Litig. 31, 32 (Fall 1999) ("[R]esearch proves
what Aristotle suggested more than 2000 years ago .... A speaker who is perceived to be
intelligent and authoritative will generally be more persuasive.").
70. Stephen M. Shapiro, Appeals--Questions, Answers, and Prepared Remarks, 15
Litig. 33, 33 (Spring 1989) (quoting in part Byron White, The Work of the Supreme Court:
A Nuts and Bolts Description, N.Y. State Bar J. 346, 383 (Oct. 1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
71. John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court
Bar, 30 J. S. Ct. History 68, 70 (2005).
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than volumes of briefs. 72 As Yogi Berra might have said, "You
can hear a lot by listening. 73
Though this may not often happen at the Supreme Court or
even in many appellate courts, I also find that cases before me
often turn out to look quite different after oral argument than I
may have supposed before argument. Oral argument puts
matters into perspective.74 A case that seemed from the briefs to
raise broad issues may after argument turn out to be capable of
disposition by a quite narrow decision. Nuance is more likely to
emerge in the live exchange between the lawyer and judge. And
although most cases have many points that can (and usually are)
argued in the briefs, most cases have no more than one truly
determinative point. Oral argument allows a judge to isolate and
clarify that pivotal or determinative issue in the case, an issue
that the lawyers may have intentionally sought to obscure in
their written briefs.
Admittedly, oral argument does not often cause judges to
change their views entirely about which party should prevail.
But the exchange of ideas among the judges and the lawyers
during oral argument can provide judges with a measure of
confidence in their decisionmaking that cannot be provided by
written briefs alone.75 Moreover, if clients attend, the argument
can increase their confidence in the judiciary and ease the
lawyers' burden of explanation and justification. Finally, speech
is dynamic in a way that writing can never be. Oral argument
can convey a sense of urgency, sincerity, and (dare I say?)
emotion that is not easily communicated by a written brief, for
the speaker has at his disposal intonation, gesture, and other
72. See Ltr. from Alan B. Morrison, President, American Academy of Appellate
Lawyers, to Senate Judiciary Committee (Dec. 29, 1999) (commenting on Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee Chairman's Report, supra n. 37) (available at http://www.appellateacademy
.org/publications/oral argument.pdf (accessed Sept. 24, 2008; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process)).
73. Berra once pointed out that "[y]ou can observe a lot by watching." See LTD Ent.,
Yogi Berra-The Official Website, Yogi-isms, http://www.yogiberra.com/yogi-isms.html
(accessed Oct. 15, 2009; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
74. See Scalia & Garner, supra n. 69, at 140.
75. See John M. Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an
Appeal? 41 Cornell L.Q. 6, 7 (1956) ("[O]ral argument gives an opportunity for
interchange between court and counsel which the briefs do not give. For my part, there is
no substitute . . . for ... getting at the real heart of an issue and in finding out where the
truth lies.").
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non-verbal cues that are unavailable to the writer.7 6  Put
differently, while "spoken utterances tend to indicate both what
is said and how it is to be taken, written ones tend to specify
only the former." 77 As a consequence, speech can be more
immediate and sincere than a writing, 7which can often seem
more distant and potentially ambiguous.
In sum, written persuasion must maintain its central role in
our judicial system. Inevitably, the brief must continue to carry
the lion's share of the persuasion load. But oral persuasion can
and should play a critical supplemental role. Unfortunately, this
is a role that may often be sacrificed on the altar of efficiency.
III. FUTURE
So what of my experiment and thoughts for the future of
oral persuasion in our courts? The way I conduct argument is the
same way it is done at the appellate level. I read the briefs, the
record, and relevant cases before the argument; discuss the case
thoroughly with my law clerks; and use the argument to get
answers to my questions. Unlike an appellate court, however, I
can and do devote more than twenty or thirty minutes to each
case, and I do not have to share my time with other judges. In
fact, in the No Child Left Behind case,79 the argument lasted
over four hours, and it is not unusual for arguments in my court
to span an hour or two. However, with less complex motions-
76. See Irving R. Kaufman, Appellate Advocacy in the Federal Courts, 79 F.R.D. 165,
171 (1978); David R. Olson, From Utterance to Text: The Bias of Language in Speech and
Writing, 47 Harv. Educ. Rev. 257, 263 (1977). Indeed, in a text originally published in
1888, the authors offered this observation about the value of oral advocacy:
What is heard creates a much more decided impression than what is read....
Voice and gesture give force and emphasis. Points are more forcibly and more
distinctly presented to the mind by an oral argument than by a written brief. The
collision on points of difference is more marked, and the agreement on points
conceded more noticeable, in an oral argument than in a written discussion.
Byron K. Elliott & William F. Elliott, The Work of the Advocate (2d ed., Bobbs-Merrill
Co. 1911).
77. David R. Olson, The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications
of Writing and Reading 91 (Cambridge U. Press 1994).
78. See J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 743, 756
(1987) (pointing out that speech is "immediate, unambiguous, and sincere," while writing
can often seem "distant, ambiguous, and potentially misleading").
79. See Conn. v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Conn. 2006).
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such as a motion for more definite statement, motion to remand,
or simple motion to dismiss-I will often hold oral argument
over the telephone (with my court reporter) so that the lawyers
do not have to drag themselves to the New Haven Courthouse.
That said, ordinarily, I do not hold arguments in cases in which
one of the parties is pro se. And while I do not do it as often as I
would like, I do issue oral rulings, though I heed Judge Posner's
advice and write out my thoughts in advance. Typically, I also
do not deliver the opinion on the day of argument but delay it a
week or so.
I started this experiment as a way to contribute to the legal
profession. Judge Edward Becker once remarked that affording
oral argument to lawyers, who generally want it, is a mark of
respect for our joint profession. I agree with that sentiment, so I
thought I would provide a measure of respect to lawyers by
offering oral argument as a sort of educational opportunity. I
never thought I would be the chief beneficiary of the arguments.
But I quickly found that I was very wrong. Holding oral
argument helps me as much as, or even more, than it helps
counsel. My law clerks also find argument helpful and would
revolt if I did away with argument because it also makes their
lives easier.
I am told by other judges that they do not have time for
argument because it is inefficient. I have two responses. First, I
readily acknowledge that I come from a district that has
managed to get its caseload under control. I do not have a docket
of 800 or 1200 civil cases, or anything close to it. Therefore, I
recognize that I have a luxury others do not: time for oral
argument. I would note, however, that many other districts and
judges have caseloads similar to mine, and that many courts of
appeals have experienced flat or declining dockets outside of
immigration cases. 80 Trials are also vanishing, we are told. As a
consequence, I believe that in many cases, we can make more
time for oral argument if we are committed to it.
Second, I have come to believe that I do not have enough
time to dispense with oral argument. That is, I find oral
80. See Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the "Crisis of Volume ",
8 J. App. Prac. & Process 101, 113 (2006) ("Today, most of us seem to be content in
believing that the courts of appeals survived the 'crisis of volume,' whether it was real or
imagined.").
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argument is a time saver. It makes me more efficient and
effective. I say this because, as I mentioned before, the briefs in
cases before me often do not map onto one another. Whether
intentionally or otherwise, lawyers frequently do not address
each other's central points or do so only glancingly. Oral
argument, therefore, allows me to clarify issues, obtain
concessions, gain perspective, and even eliminate issues that I
might otherwise have to discuss in a written opinion. I learn a lot
from oral argument, and it gives me an extra measure of
confidence that I do, indeed, fully understand the relevant facts
and issues and that I am ruling only on those issues that
absolutely need my decision.
I readily admit that in this sense, oral argument at the
district court level may be quite different from what it is at the
appellate courts. There, the issues are usually more focused and
discrete than they are in the district court, where counsel rightly
want to try out issues that may be quite unfocused and to
preserve all possible avenues for appeal. Because the issues are
more specific at the appellate level, there may be less risk of
error in understanding what the parties really mean in their
arguments and also less likelihood that the lawyers will
completely ignore their opposing counsel's arguments. As a
consequence, and perhaps counter-intuitively, I suggest that
district courts may benefit from oral argument more than
appellate courts.
I am also told that lawyers are not good oral advocates and
that as a result, oral argument is a waste of time. But of course,
denying lawyers a chance at oral argument as a punishment for
their lack of competence yields a self-fulfilling prophecy, for
lawyers are unlikely to develop strong oral-argument skills if
they almost never have the opportunity to use them. And even if
many lawyers will never become good oral advocates, that is not
a reason to dispense with oral argument. I find value in requiring
lawyers to respond to my questions, even when the lawyers are
not so good. I believe that Judge Posner got it right when he
observed that "[a]lthough the average quality of oral argument
in federal courts (including the Supreme Court) is not high, the
value of oral argument to judges is very high."8 I agree too with
81. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 160-61 (Harvard U.
Press 1996).
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Chief Justice Roberts, who summed up the value of oral
argument this way after his first year on the District of Columbia
Circuit: "My main conclusion after a year of being on the other
side of the bench is that oral argument is terribly, terribly
important. I feel more confident about that now than I ever did
as an advocate."
82
Despite my commitment to oral argument, however, I
would agree that a set-piece argument is not a good use of any
lawyers' or judges' time. Nor is it useful for a judge to hold oral
argument without mastering the briefs, issues, cases, and record.
Using oral argument as a way for the judge to come up to speed
on the case squanders an opportunity for both counsel and the
court, and it is a shameful waste of money for clients, who must
foot the bill for what is ultimately an empty exercise. Making
oral argument effective thus places burdens on the judge, though
they are burdens that I believe a judge should want to shoulder.
Finally, I believe that oral argument helps me, as a judge,
reflect on the issues presented in the case. "Persuasion is
sometimes characterized as opinion change that follows from
consideration of reasoned discourse, 83 and to me, reflection
equates with consideration of reasoned discourse. John Dewey
described reflection as "turning a topic over in various aspects
and in various lights so that nothing significant about it shall be
overlooked-almost as one might turn a stone over to see what
its hidden side is like or what is covered by it."84 That is how I
use oral argument-to turn a case, or an issue, upside down and
over and over again, hoping to see its hidden side, to ensure that
I fully understand it and all of its implications. The value of this
process leads me to believe that in our headlong, and not
altogether inappropriate, rush toward judicial efficiency, we
should not-indeed, we must not-forget the value of reflection
and the role that oral argument can play in that most critical of
all judicial endeavors.
82. Roberts, supra n. 71, at 69 (emphasis added).
83. The Persuasion Handbook, supra n. 46, at xv.
84. John Dewey, How We Think 57 (Prometheus Books 1991).
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IV. CONCLUSION
After experimenting with oral argument in my courtroom, I
have concluded that oral persuasion is not a substitute for
written briefs. It is only a supplement. Yet it is a vital
supplement. And so it should remain.
